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I. INTRODUCTION 
Until the summer of 2005, Dutch law did not offer an appropriate means for 
dealing with mass claims efficiently and effectively.1 The multitude of parties 
and their individual circumstances created too much complexity for Dutch 
procedural law to deal with mass damages cases effectively.2 In July 2005, a new 
mechanism for dealing with mass damages came into force.3 This mechanism is 
based on the Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade (“WCAM”), an act on 
collective settlement of mass damages.4 
The WCAM offers a means for the settlement of mass damages.5 The 
application of WCAM is based upon an agreement, which provides for the 
 
* Bart Krans is professor of private law at University of Groningen. 
1. See generally Willem H. van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in the Netherlands, 
ROTTERDAM INSTITUTE OF PRIVATE LAW 171, 173-78 (Matthias Casper et al. eds., 2009). 
2. Id. at 176-77. 
3. Van Boom, supra note 1, 177-78; see generally H.B. Krans, The Dutch Class Action (Financial 
Settlement) Act in an International Context: The Shell Case and the Converium Case, 31 C.J.Q. (2012), 141; see 
generally D. Ozmis & I.N. Tzankova, De Evaluatie van de WCAM: de Kernthema’s Uitgelicht, TIJDSCHRIFT 
VOOR CIVIELE RECHTSPLEGING 33, 33 (2012) (Neth.). 
4. See generally Van Boom, supra note 1; see generally Ozmis & Tzankova, supra note 3. 
5. The WCAM has been the subject of a number of publications. See, e.g., Van Boom, supra note 1, at 
171; see, e.g., Tomas Arons & Willem H. van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities 
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settlement of mass damages claims.6 This agreement must be concluded between 
organizations that represent victims and the parties who will provide 
compensation.7 Once an agreement is achieved, parties can apply jointly to the 
court to declare the agreement binding upon all persons who suffer damage as a 
result of the event or events referred to in the contract.8 If the court grants the 
application, the agreement is binding on the entire group of victims referred to in 
the contract.9 The proceedings before the court therefore do not primarily concern 
the relationship between the contracting parties, but rather they concern the 
settlement agreement and its consequences for the victims.10 The court of appeal 
in Amsterdam is competent to decide on the application.11 
Since the enactment of this WCAM, seven applications have been brought to 
the court.12 The application to declare the contract generally binding was granted 
in six of these cases.13 In July 2013, several amendments to the WCAM came into 
force.14 Two main amendments were made to the WCAM: the option of a pretrial 
 
Claim Settlement from the Netherlands, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857, 857 (2010). Regarding publications in Dutch 
I will limit myself to refer to Ozmis & Tzankova, supra note 3, at 33-42, D.F. Lunsingh Scheurleer, Collectief 
Schikken met de wet Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade’, in IN DE SCHADUW VAN HET SLACHTOFFER 49-
58 (C.J.M. Klaassen ed., 2013). H.B. Krans, Een Nieuwe Aanpak van Massaschade, 2005/2 NTBR 2. 
6. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 178; Krans, supra note 3, at 142. 
7. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW], art. 7:907 (Neth.); see Krans, supra note 3, at 142; see Van Boom, supra 
note 1, at 178. Insurance companies can also act as parties to the contract. 
8. Krans supra note 3, at 142; Van Boom, supra note 1 at 179. 
9. Krans supra note 3, at 142; Van Boom, supra note 1 at 179; BW, art. 7:907 (Neth.). 
10. Once the settlement agreement is declared generally binding these victims referred to in the contract 
are considered as parties to the settlement agreement. BW art. 7:908 (Neth.); see infra Part VIII. 
11. Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [Rv], art. 1013, para 3 (Neth.); Van Boom, supra note 1, at 
181-82; Krans, supra, note 3, at 142. 
12. Hof’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m.nt. [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2006:AX6440] (Foundation 
Centre DES et al.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Foundation Centre DES]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 25 januari 2007, JOR 2007, 
71 m.nt. AFJA Leijten [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ7033] (Dexia Bank Nederland NV/Foundation Platform 
Aandelenlease) (Neth.) [hereinafter Dexia Bank]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA 
Leijten [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI5744] (Shell Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank Nederland NV) (Neth.) 
[hereinafter Shell Petroleum NV]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 april 2009, JOR 2009, 196 m.nt. AFJA Leijten 
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI2717] (Foundation Vie D’Or) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vie D’Or]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 15 
juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 m.nt. ACW Pijls [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:BJ2691] (Randstad Holding) (Neth.) 
[hereinafter Ranstad Holding]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. JS Kortmann 
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO3908] (Scor Holding/Interim Decision) (Neth.) [hereinafter Scor Holding/Interim 
Decision]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012: 
BV1026] (Scor Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Scor Holding]. In the seventh case there is an Interim Decision 
(Hof Amsterdam 12 november 2013, JOR 2013, 343 m.nt. AFJA Leijten (Schimmelpenninnck and Knüppe q.q. 
et al./X et al.; interimdecision)), but there is not final decision yet. 
13. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; Dexia Bank, supra note 12; Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 
12; Vie D’Or, supra note 12; Randstad Holding, supra note 12; Scor Holding/Interim Decision, supra note 12; 
Scor Holding, supra note 12. 
14. Stb. 2013, P. 256. 
05_KRANS_MASTER_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015  12:52 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27 
283 
hearing was introduced15 and the scope of the WCAM was extended to apply to 
bankruptcy cases.16 
As a consequence of the Dexia case, in July 2013, one of the aforementioned 
technical changes to the WCAM concerned a clarification of the scope of the 
WCAM.17 According to the wording of the WCAM the agreement must seek 
compensation for damages.18 According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
amending Act, the Dexia case demonstrated that claims in the case of mass 
damages do not have to be claims for compensation.19 Many claims in the Dexia 
case concerned the validity of contracts and the remission of debts to the bank.20 
This contribution will explore the system under the WCAM, some aspects of 
case law, and some elements of WCAM’s July 2013 amendment. 
II. REASON FOR AND SCOPE OF THE WCAM 
Before the WCAM came into force, Dutch law did not offer the courts an 
adequate toolkit for dealing with mass damages.21 There were several options, but 
each of them had serious disadvantages.22 For example, Dutch law does not 
recognize class actions to allow parties to ask for compensation in a collective 
action.23 A foundation or an association that meets certain requirements can 
institute an action intended to promote the similar interests of other persons, but 
the object of this right of action cannot be to seek monetary compensation.24 
When designing the WCAM, the legislator considered whether this restriction 
should be abolished, but decided not to make that change.25 Opening up the 
possibility of seeking monetary compensation in a class action would make a 
procedure with a large number of claimants “unmanageable.”26 Settlement of 
 
15. See infra Part IV. 
16. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the amendment to the WCAM, the Minister refers in this respect 
to the bankruptcy of the DSB Bank (a Dutch bank which was declared bankrupt in 2009). The validation of 
individual bank creditors’ claims can be an administrative burden, so stated the Minister. The WCAM 
procedure could be an appropriate procedure in mass claims to replace this costly and time-consuming 
validation procedure. See MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 10-11. This new option for the application of the 
WCAM in bankruptcy cases will be excluded from this article.  
17. See id. at 17. 
18. See, e.g., BW art. 7:907 para. 1 (Neth.). 
19. Id. at 29. 
20. The WCAM can also be applied to agreements that provide aggrieved persons with other rights than 
compensation. See BW art. 7:907 (Neth.). 
21. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 173-78 (discussing the history of the different Acts passed before the 
WCAM). 
22. See generally id. 
23. See id. 
24. BW art. 3:305(a)(1) (Neth.). 
25. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, part 2, pp. 2-3. 
26. Id. at 8-9. 
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mass damages claims through the WCAM would be more profitable, the Minister 
of Justice stated.27 
The direct cause for the WCAM was the DES Case.28 This case concerned a 
defective pharmaceutical that was intended for use during pregnancy.29 It 
transpired when this pharmaceutical caused severe physical injuries to the 
daughters of women who took the medicine.30 These women turned to the 
pharmaceutical’s manufacturers, but they were initially confronted with a 
difficulty in establishing causation, i.e. proving which manufacturer had 
produced the pills their mothers had taken long ago.31 The case was taken to the 
Dutch Supreme Court on the issue of causation, which the court found in the 
claimants’ favor.32 However, this case was not yet over. After several more years, 
the DES-fund turned to the Dutch Ministry of Justice and requested its 
cooperation in finding a solution for this case.33 The Ministry of Justice, 
responsible for the lion’s share of civil legislation in the Netherlands, decided to 
draw up an act, but wanted to avoid ad hoc legislation.34 The scope of the new act 
had to be broader than just one case.35 The WCAM was the result.36 
It is interesting to note the type of cases to which the WCAM has been 
applied so far. The WCAM does not define mass damages.37 The settlement 
agreement must concern compensation of damages “caused by an event or 
similar events.”38 With respect to the type of cases to which the WCAM could be 
applied, the Minister of Justice mentioned examples during the design phase, 
such as the disaster at an exploding fireworks factory in Enschede (a town in the 
 
27. Id. at 5. During the parliamentary debate on the July 2013 amendments it was also argued that the 
prohibition to seek monetary compensation in a class action should be abolished. In its reaction the Minister of 
Justice discussed options for a collective action seeking monetary compensation, but did not propose the 
abolishment of the prohibition to seek monetary compensation in a class action. See generally Letter Minister 
Justice, TK 2011-12, 33 126, no. 6. 
28. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; see P.N. van Regteren Altena, De Collectieve Afwikkeling van 
de Des-zaak in Nederland, in HET WETSVOORSTEL COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING VAN MASSASCHADE 27 (A.I.M. 
van Mierlo et al. eds., 2005). 
29. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12, at 4. 
30. Id. 
31. Lucas Bergkamp, Compensating Personal Injuries Caused by DES: “No Causation Liability” in the 
Netherlands, 1 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 35, 35 (1994). 
32. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
33. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, p. 1. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the WCAM, the Minister of Justice referred to the American 
class action (Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) and stated that the vast majority of the “mass tort 
class actions” do not lead to a final judgment, but end with a settlement. He also stated that American practices 
also demonstrate that parties often reach a settlement and that afterwards a fresh damages class action is started 
to have the settlement declared generally binding. That outcome to the settlement of mass damages actions is 
comparable to the WCAM, stated the Minister. Id. at 4. 
37. See BW art. 7:907 (Neth.). 
38. Id. 
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Netherlands), a fire that broke out in a crowded cafe in Volendam (also a town in 
the Netherlands), and the DES case on defective medication.39 When studying the 
WCAM and its parliamentary documentation, it is easy to gain the impression 
that the WCAM’s design focus was on personal injury cases. However, out of the 
six cases dealt with under the WCAM, only one dealt with personal injury.40 The 
other five cases have concerned purely financial matters.41 
III. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The court application to declare a settlement agreement binding is not merely 
a formality. According to the WCAM, the court must consider many aspects 
when deciding if the settlement agreement is binding.42 Many of these elements 
concern the settlement agreement. 
This collective settlement is an agreement concerning the payment of 
compensation for damages caused by “an event or similar events.”43 The 
settlement agreement must include a description of the group or groups of 
persons on whose behalf the agreement was concluded.44 The idea is that the 
settlement agreement uses damage scheduling.45 The injured persons are divided 
into groups based on several factors.46 The amount of compensation they are 
entitled to depends on their group classification.47 The advantage of this damage 
scheduling is that there is no need to identify all the victim’s individual 
circumstances relating to their damages: causation, exact amount of damages, 
contributory negligence, etc.48 It is clear that this system promotes efficiency.49 
Since July 2013, the WCAM also makes clear that the settlement agreement must 
contain a description of the event or events the to which the agreement relates.50 
The settlement agreement must also contain the most accurate possible 
indication of the number of persons belonging to the group or groups.51 This 
requirement relates to the fact that the court will deny the request for collective 
binding if no sufficient guarantee is provided for the payment of the claims made 
 
39. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, at 18. 
40. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.  
41. Id.; Dexia Bank, supra note 12; Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12; Vie D’Or, supra note 12; 
Randstad Holding, supra note 12; Scor Holding/Interim Decision, supra note 12; Scor Holding, supra note 12. 
42. See BW art. 7:907 (Neth.). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, part 4, pp. 8. 
46. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414 no.3, at pp. 11-12. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 8. 
49. Id.  
50. BW art. 7:907(2)(a) (Neth.).  
51. Id. at art. 7:907(2)(c). 
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under the contract.52 Several elements must be mentioned in the contract, such as 
the conditions for applying for compensation under the contract53 and details of 
the address to opt out.54 The agreement must, inter alia, also provide an option 
for an independent adjudication of disputes that might arise from the contract by 
someone other than the court which has jurisdiction according to the law.55 
The amount of compensation awarded to the victims is sometimes referred to 
as the heart of the settlement agreement.56 According to the WCAM, the court 
will reject an application to declare an agreement generally binding if it considers 
the compensation awarded unfair with respect to the amount of damages, the 
simplicity and speed with which the compensation can be obtained, and the 
available causes of the damage.57 
A hardship clause can be part of the settlement agreement.58 Such a clause 
can form the basis of a more individual approach towards victims than is 
envisaged by the damage scheduling.59 To a certain extent, it could lead to certain 
victims within a group being entitled to more compensation than others.60 The 
settlement agreement in the DES case did not contain a hardship clause.61 The 
court considered that such a clause could seem appealing because the specific 
circumstances of the individual cases could be taken into account when 
establishing the amount of compensation.62 However, the court went on to say, 
there were also reasons for arguing against that approach.63 A significant number 
of the injured parties could argue that their cases were special, which would lead 
to several negative outcomes.64 Therefore, the court decided that the contracting 
parties could in reasonableness omit that clause.65 Instead, there was a clause in 
the DES case settlement agreement providing that victims for whom the burden 
of damage would be unreasonably hard despite the agreement’s effect could be 
more generously compensated.66 The presence of this clause played a role in the 
 
52. Id. at art. 7:907(3)(c). 
53. Id. at art. 7:907(2)(e). 
54. Id. at art. 7:907(2)(g). 
55. Id. at art. 7:907(3)(d). 
56. H.B. Krans, DES en Dexia: de Eerste Ervaringen met Collectieve Afkikkeling van Massaschade, 41 
NJB 2598, 2602 (2007). 
57. BW art. 7:907(3)(b) (Neth.). 
58. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
59. Id. 
60. Id.  
61. Id.  
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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court’s decision that the amounts of compensation agreed in the contract were not 
unreasonable.67 
IV. ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS 
The settlement agreement necessary for the WCAM is a voluntary 
agreement.68 The WCAM assumes that the parties will reach a collective 
settlement.69 Why would parties voluntarily oblige themselves to provide 
compensation? The negotiations do not start at gunpoint. There has to be a 
willingness to negotiate on both sides of the table.70 Several incentives to settle 
can be identified for the parties who provide compensation.71 A few aspects that 
could promote out-of-court settlement will be considered in this section.72 
First, the application of the WCAM decreases the chance of a multitude of 
individual proceedings, perhaps lasting years.73 Long-lasting individual 
proceedings carry costs and uncertainty with them.74 They can also lead to 
continuing bad publicity.75 It is obvious that avoiding this is a potential benefit. In 
this respect the WCAM offers the option to prevent further damage to 
reputation.76 The finality of the settlement agreement with the victims, who are 
bound by the contract, can be an incentive.77 This finality can lead to a degree of 
certainty about the financial obligations towards the victims.78 
The terminology used in the WCAM is not liable for parties or persons, but 
parties who commit themselves by this agreement to provide compensation.79 
This is deliberately done to prevent the parties who committed themselves to pay 
from directly or indirectly admitting that they are liable.80 Victims who opt out or 
victims to whom the settlement agreement does not refer could use such 
admission in establishing their individual claims.81 
The WCAM’s opt-out system can also promote the number of victims who are 
ultimately bound by the contract, in the sense that they lose their right to start 
 
67. Id. 
68. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 178. 
69. MvT, TK 2008-09, 31 76, no. 1, p.7. 
70. See Van Boom, supra note 1, at 180. 
71. Id. 
72. See H.B. Krans, Procesrechtelijke Prikkels en Knelpunten van de WCAM, in RECHT IN REGIO 37-38 
(A.L.M. Keirse et al. eds., 2006).  
73. See MvT, TK 2008-2009, 31 762, no. 1, p. 6. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 1-2. 
78. Id. 
79. BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.). 
80. See MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 10. 
81. See infra Part VIII. 
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individual proceedings against the parties that, according to claimants, are liable for 
their losses.82 Moreover, if the parties who commit themselves to providing 
compensation wish to avoid excessive uncertainty about the number of victims who 
will opt out, they can make a reservation on that point.83 The settlement contract 
cannot be conditional, except for a condition as to the percentage of victims referred 
to in the contract who may opt out.84 If such a condition is part of the contract, the 
parties who commit themselves by the agreement to provide compensation are 
entitled to terminate the contract if the agreement fails to cover enough victims.85 The 
agreement in the DES case contained such a condition,86 while the agreement in the 
Dexia case did not contain such a condition.87 
A WCAM application must be filed at the court of appeal in Amsterdam.88 The 
legislature deliberately chose a court of appeal instead of a first instance district court 
as the competent court.89 A court of appeal decision in WCAM cases is open to 
cassation, but only by the applicants together.90 This system means that a WCAM 
application will only be brought before the Supreme Court, which rules in cassation, 
if the court of appeal denies an application to declare the settlement contract 
generally binding.91 If the request is granted, cassation is not possible.92 This system 
has caused debate among Dutch scholars.93 The Minister opposed more generous 
options for appeal because in a procedure where a large number of interested parties 
are involved, an option for appeal can cause serious delay for all of them.94 The 
Minister gave great weight to the avoidance of delay.95 Therefore, it is a one-shot 
procedure except for cassation. In some ways this is remarkable because it offers 
interested victims only one chance to articulate their views.96 However, if victims are 
not happy with the final result, they retain the option to opt out.97 
It can easily be argued that the WCAM does not provide sufficient incentive for 
the parties to settle voluntarily. This is true—there is no formal pressure.98 So far, 
agreements have nonetheless been achieved in the Netherlands. Apparently, both 
 
82. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 185. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 186. 
85. BW art 7:908(4) (Neth.). 
86. See Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
87. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. 
88.  RV art. 1013(3) (Neth.). 
89. See id. 
90. Id. at art. 1018(1). 
91. Krans, supra note 56, at 2599-2601. 
92. Id. at 2600. 
93. Id. at 2601. 
94. MvT, TK 2003-2004, 29 414, no.3, p. 31.  
95. Id. at 15. 
96. Id. 
97. See infra Part VIII. 
98. See generally RV art. 1013 (Neth.). 
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sides in these settled cases have recognized the benefits of the WCAM. Nevertheless, 
in recent years the Dutch Legislature has considered how to promote out-of-court 
settlement. An evaluation of the WCAM in 2008 played an important role.99 
At the time of that evaluation, two cases had been handled under the WCAM 
(DES and Dexia) and settlement agreements had already been concluded in other 
cases.100 In a letter to Parliament on the evaluation, the Minister of Justice stated 
that the total value of these cases was just under EUR 1.5 billion.101 Consultation 
with judges, lawyers, interest organizations, and the parties who had caused the 
damages and were directly involved in these cases were part of the evaluation.102 
One of the main findings was that the WCAM provides an efficient and effective 
method for settling damages collectively, but in the absence of a willingness to 
negotiate, the Act does not supply a solution.103 One of the other findings of the 
evaluation is that the WCAM is widely applicable, although this was not always 
reflected properly by the terminology used in the Act.104 A third finding of the 
evaluation concerned the concurrence of individual proceedings and the judicial 
examination of the application.105 The Dexia case demonstrated that the legal 
rules on suspension required adjustment, for example, to avoid that this 
concurrence influences the success of the settlement agreement.106 
Based on the evaluation, the Minister of Justice proposed several additional 
measures.107 One of them was a pretrial hearing, which has been part of the 
WCAM since July 2013.108 This pretrial hearing offers parties and the court the 
opportunity to explore whether a collective settlement can be reached.109 The goal 
is, according to the Minister of Justice, to assist parties in the out-of-court 
negotiations so that they can conclude a settlement agreement.110 At this hearing, 
the court might be able to assist parties in formulating the main point of dispute 
and stimulate them to reach a settlement, according to the Explanatory 
Memorandum.111 It had already been suggested in the 2008 WCAM evaluation 
 
99. See generally MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3. 
100. See Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. 
101. MvT, TK 2008-09, 31 762, no. 1, p. 3. 
102. Id. at 5-6. 
103. Id. at 4. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 5-6; see infra Part VII. 
107. See generally MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414 no.3 
108. See RV art. 1018(a) (Neth.). The other change is that since that date the WCAM is also applicable to 
bankruptcy cases. In the explanatory memorandum to the amendment to the WCAM, the Minister refers to the 
bankruptcy of the DSB Bank in 2009. The validation of individual bank creditors’ claims can be an 
administrative burden. The WCAM procedure could be an appropriate procedure in mass claims to replace this 
costly and time-consuming validation procedure. See also MvT, TK 2011-2012, 33 126, no. 3, p. 7. 
109. See RV art. 1018(a) (Neth.). 
110. MvT, TK 2011-12, 33 126, no. 3, p. 26. 
111. Id. at 25. 
05_KRANS_MASTER_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015  12:52 PM 
2014 / The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages 
290 
that the court could assist the parties in formulating some of the important points 
for negotiation and encourage them to reach agreement.112 
In the 2008 evaluation, the Minister also suggested introducing the option for 
courts to ask questions directly to the Supreme Court by way of pre-judicial 
procedure, which was introduced in Dutch law in 2012.113 The application of the 
WCAM was an important motive for introducing this pre-judicial procedure.114 
Being able to seek answers from the highest court on essential legal issues can 
have several benefits in mass cases. The Minister of Justice lists several 
advantages in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Act on pre-judicial questions 
to the Supreme Court.115 One is that it can promote out-of-court settlement.116 
Moreover, if the answer to an important legal question can be taken into account 
in the settlement agreement, this can improve the quality of that agreement and 
enhance its acceptance, and avoid possible later dissatisfaction with its content.117 
In addition, it might prevent aggrieved parties opting out or initiating individual 
proceedings.118 Therefore, although the application of the WCAM played an 
important role in introducing the pre-judicial procedure into Dutch law, the scope 
of this new procedure was deliberately not limited to WCAM cases. However, 
there is a restriction with respect to WCAM cases: the option to ask questions of 
the Supreme Court is not available to the court dealing with a WCAM 
application.119 
The rationale behind this exclusion is that once the WCAM application for 
collective binding effect is filed, the court has to decide whether the settlement 
agreement is fair. This settlement agreement could very well have been 
concluded, despite some of the legal issues relevant to it not having been settled 
definitively.120 Therefore, the Minister stated that asking questions of the 
Supreme Court at that stage could disturb the balance of a settlement 
agreement.121 
Considering the introduction of the pre-judicial procedure and the pretrial 
hearing, the Dutch legislator can be regarded as having chosen to increase the 
role of the courts in WCAM proceedings. Considering the aforementioned 
possible advantages of these new mechanisms, this would appear be a good thing 
because it could promote the conclusion of settlement agreements and therefore 
decrease the chances of multiple individual proceedings. 
 
112. MvT, TK 2008-09, 21 762, no. 1, p. 6. 
113. Id. 
114. See RV art. 392-94 (Neth.). 
115. MvT, TK 2010-11, 32 612, no.3 p.6. 
116. See id.; see also RV art. 392 (Neth.).  
117. MvT, TK 2010-11, 32 612, no.3 p.6.; see also RV art. 392(3)-(4) (Neth.). 
118. See MvT, TK 2010- 11, 32 612, no. 3, pp. 3-4. 
119. Id. at 7; see also RV art. 392(1) (Neth.). 
120. See MvT, TK 2010-2011, 32 612, no. 3, p. 6. 
121. Id. 
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V. CONTRACTING PARTIES 
As far as the “paying side” is concerned, one or more parties who commit 
themselves by this agreement to pay compensation conclude the settlement 
contract.122 The Legislature has, as stated, chosen not to use the word ‘liable’ in 
the WCAM.123 Therefore, it can remain undecided whether the parties who 
provide compensation are in fact liable.124 Insurance companies can also be 
contracting parties.125 In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister of Justice 
remarked that insurance companies can take the initiative for negotiations on a 
settlement agreement.126 
Parties on the other side have to be victim representative organizations: 
foundations or associations with full legal competence, which must represent the 
interests of the victims according to their statutes.127 In addition, the court must 
deny a request for collective binding effect if the organization is not sufficiently 
representative of the interests of the persons on whose behalf the agreement is 
concluded.128 Practice has shown that the settlement agreements in several cases 
were concluded by more than one foundation or association.129 
Accordingly, the Court has to rule on the requirement of 
representativeness.130 In the DES case, it was argued that a representative 
organization (Stichting Des-centrum) was not sufficiently representative because 
(to put it briefly) it was not clear whether the outcome of the negotiations was 
sufficiently satisfactory for the victims.131 The court ruled that it was possible for 
the outcome of negotiations to be less than some people hoped for or expected, 
but this would not stand on its own as a sufficiently concrete indication that a 
significant group of victims rejects the outcome of negotiations.132 In that sense, 
there was no reason to consider the Stichting Des-centrum insufficiently 
representative of the victims’ interests.133 
 
122. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 179. 
123. See generally id. 
124. See generally id. 
125. See MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, part 3, pp. 10-11. 
126. Id. 
127. BW art. 7:907(1)(c) (Neth.). 
128. BW art. 7:907(3)(f) (Neth.). 
129. This was also expressed in the parliamentary documents leading to the amendment of the WCAM in 
July 2013. See MvT, TK 2012-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 14. Accordingly, this amendment clarified in the wording of 
the Act that the agreement can be concluded by one or more associations or foundations representing the 
interests of the victims. See MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 14.  
130. The aforementioned July 2013 amendment of the WCAM also tightened the requirements on 
representativeness for a foundation or an association to start a collective action by changing BW art. 3:305(a)(2) 
(Neth.). This representativeness requirement for collective actions has since then been the equivalent of the 
same requirement in the WCAM. MvT, TK 2012-2013, 33 126, no. 3, p. 10. 
131. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
132. Id. 
133. See Krans, supra note 56, at 2600-01. 
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In Dexia, the court of appeal in Amsterdam ruled that it was not necessary 
for each of the four applicants to represent the entire group of victims, as long as 
each of them was sufficiently representative of a sufficiently significant group of 
these people.134 
VI. JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT 
Once an agreement is concluded, the contracting parties can ask the court to 
declare the settlement generally binding.135 The request must be done jointly by 
the contracting parties.136 Therefore, from that point on, these parties have a 
common goal: the general binding effect of the settlement agreement.137 This, of 
course, does not mean that only the voice of the contracting parties can be heard 
in court.138 Before ruling on the application, the court must call the persons on 
whose behalf the agreement is concluded, as far as they are known.139 They are, 
of course, not obliged to come to the court, but they must have the opportunity to 
appear.140 They are also entitled to file a statement of opposition.141 
The court must consider many aspects, especially of the settlement contract, 
when deciding to grant or to deny the application. Given the consequences of a 
positive court decision, such careful deliberation is fully justified.142 
One of the grounds for the court to deny the application is if the settlement 
agreement does not contain all the prescribed elements: damage scheduling, an 
accurate indication of the number of victims per group, the amount of 
compensation awarded, the conditions that must be met by the victims, the name 
or address for an opt-out declaration, etc.143 
Perhaps the most important element is the amount of compensation 
awarded.144 If this amount is not reasonable, the Act requires the court to deny the 
application.145 The WCAM prescribes that when deciding the amount of 
compensation, the court must consider the simplicity and the speed at which the 
compensation can be obtained and the possible causes of the damage.146 The court 
 
134. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. 
135. BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.). 
136. Id. 
137. See id. 




142. See id.; see generally BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.).  
143. See BW art. 7:907(2) (Neth.).  
144. See id. at art. 7:907(3)(b); see Krans, supra note 56, at 2602. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
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has considered this point in its rulings in all of the cases decided so far, and fairly 
comprehensively in several other cases.147 
In the Dexia case, for example, some of the aggrieved persons referred to in 
the contract who presented their views on the request in the WCAM proceedings 
stated that the agreed amounts of compensation did not sufficiently reflect the 
damage suffered.148 The court considered, after having investigated the structure 
of the agreements and the agreed amounts, that the settlement agreement was the 
outcome of negotiations undertaken in a context of insecurity, where concessions 
were made by both sides and risks were estimated.149 The mere fact that the 
agreement did not provide for full compensation, or the higher amount that the 
complainants preferred, could not give rise to the conclusion that the agreed 
amounts were not fair.150 The court also extensively explored the criticism leveled 
at Dexia for the damage.151 Having established this criticism, the court ruled that 
the agreed amounts were sufficient in the context of these criticisms.152 The 
arguments presented by the claimants that the agreed amounts were not high 
enough were ultimately rejected.153 
Deciding on the fairness of the agreed amount can be an especially difficult 
task for the court given that the WCAM procedure is special in the sense that the 
court can only rule on a joint application.154 The contracting parties must bring 
the application together.155 This means that once the settlement agreement is 
concluded, the contracting parties, who previously negotiated the settlement, gain 
a common goal: securing a declaration from the court that the contract is binding 
upon all the persons referred to in the contract. The result of this procedure is 
that, once they turn to the courts, their interests are common.156 However, the 
court must decide the application on the basis of the interests of all the victims 
 
147. See, e.g., Dexia Bank, supra note 12; see, e.g., Vie D’Or, supra note 12; see, e.g., Shell Petroleum 
NV, supra note 12; see, e.g., Randstad Holding, supra note 12; see, e.g., Scor Holding, supra note 12. 





153. Id. Among Dutch scholars there seems to be no consensus on the nature of this assessment by the 
court. It is stated that the assessment of the fairness of the compensation in the agreement is extensive. B.J. 
BROEKEMA-ENGELEN, TEKST & COMMENTAAR BURGERLIJK WETBOEK (J.H. Nieuwenhuis et al. eds. 2013); 
BW art. 7:907(5) (Neth.). On the other hand it is also remarked that this assessment is more marginal. W.J.J. 
LOS, Toepassing van de WCAM Bespiegelingen Over de rol en de Taak van de Rechter, in COLLECTIEVE 
ACTIES IN HET ALGEMEEN EN DE WCAM IN HET BIJZONDER par. 6 (2013); A.J. KOK AND M.H.C. SINNIGHE 
DAMSTÉ, CONVERIUM: EEN STAP VOORUIT BIJ COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING VAN INTERNATIONALE 
MASSASCHADE IN NEDERLAND, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR DE ONDERNEMINGSRECHTPRAKTIJK 34 (2011). For another 
recent publication on this topic see CARLA KLAASSEN, DE ROL VAN DE (GEWIJZIGDE) WCAM BIJ DE 
COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING VAN MASSASCHADE ‘EN NOG WAT VAN DIE DINGEN’, ARS AEQUI par. 4.1 (2013). 
154. See BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.); see also RV art. 1013 (Neth.). 
155. See RV art. 1013 (Neth.). 
156. See BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.); see also RV art. 1013 (Neth.). 
05_KRANS_MASTER_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015  12:52 PM 
2014 / The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages 
294 
referred to in the contract.157 Any objections must be brought by those victims, 
but these victims have no options for appeal or cassation.158 
If the court feels the need to hear an expert’s opinion, it can order that one or 
more experts give their opinions on matters relevant to the application.159 An 
expert report can, for example, concern the representativeness.160 The agreed 
amount of compensation can also be the topic of an expert report.161 The Dexia 
case, for example, concerned several types of financial product contracts.162 One 
of the defenses offered was that the bank itself had incurred no or limited losses 
on the shares in question because it had not actually bought and held the shares 
itself.163 It was therefore argued that it was not reasonable for these losses to have 
been covered by the bank’s clients (who bought complicated financial products 
from the bank).164 The Amsterdam court ordered an expert report on that point.165 
The Dutch Authority on Financial Markets (“AFM”) was appointed as expert.166 
Based on the AFM report, the court ruled that there was insufficient reason to 
doubt that Dexia had bought and held the shares.167 
The judicial review of the application and the settlement agreement has to 
cover other aspects as well.168 The court must, for example, deny an application if 
insufficient security is lodged to pay the contractual amounts.169 The court has 
explicitly considered this point in several cases so far.170 The agreement also has 
to provide for independent dispute resolution (by another person than the judge 
deemed competent according to the law) on issues that may arise from the 
agreement.171 In the Shell and the Dexia cases, the Amsterdam court allowed the 
settlement agreement to provide that aggrieved parties may choose whether they 
wanted to bring a dispute concerning the contract before a disputes committee or 
before the court.172 In the Explanatory Memorandum to the recent amendments to 
 
157. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 182. 
158. See id. at 186. 
159. RV art. 1016 (Neth.). 
160. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 29. 
161. Id. at 14-15. 






168. See Van Boom, supra note 1, at 183. 
169. Id. 
170. See Dexia Bank, supra note 12; see Vie D’Or, supra note 12; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 
12; see Randstad Holding, supra note 12. 
171. BW art. 7:907(3)(d) (Neth.). Until the amendment of the WCAM in July 2013, what was required 
was an independent determination of the (individual) compensation. 
172. Dexia Bank, supra note 12; Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. 
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the WCAM, the Memorandum reiterated that this was allowed because it is an 
extension of the dispute resolution options available to victims.173 
The court must also consider whether the interests of the persons on whose 
behalf the agreement was concluded are otherwise insufficiently safeguarded, 
and whether that group is large enough to justify the declaration that the 
agreement is binding.174 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the WCAM, the Minister of Justice 
stated that the court, when deciding on the fairness of the agreed amounts, can 
take into account that the total property available to the party providing 
compensation is insufficient to compensate all the victims entirely.175 It would 
appear logical that restrictions to the availability of resources are taken seriously. 
The fact that the available amount can be taken into account should improve the 
chances that a settlement agreement will be concluded. On the other hand, it 
might not be easy to establish the amount available for the execution of the 
settlement agreement.176 In its advice on the draft WCAM, the Netherlands 
Association for the Judiciary (Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtspraak 
[“NVvR”]) was critical on this point and stated that the courts might not have 
insight into the capacity for payment of the party who caused the damage.177 
The court can order the parties to complete or to adjust the agreement before 
deciding on its application.178 In the DES Case, the Amsterdam court ruled that, 
as a starting point, this option may only be used if the request for collective 
binding effect will be declined on one of the grounds for refusal of art. 7:907 
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, such as the reasonableness of the agreed amount 
or insufficient security or insufficient representativeness of the contracting 
foundation or association.179 
VII. OTHER PROCEDURAL RULES 
This section will discuss some procedural aspects of the WCAM. At the 
instigation of the Advisory Commission for Civil Procedure Law, the handling of 
WCAM cases was concentrated at one court.180 When choosing the court of 
appeal in Amsterdam, the Minister stated that would enable WCAM cases to 
benefit from the financial expertise of the Enterprise Division 
(Ondernemingskamer).181 This Enterprise Division is part of the Amsterdam 
 
173. MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, pp. 10-11. 
174. See BW art. 7:907(3)(e), (g) (Neth.). 
175. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, pp. 3, 13. See generally Krans, supra note 5, at 7, 8. 
176. Letter from the Scientific Committee to the Mayor, p. 3 (Aug. 26, 2011) (on file with author). 
177. Id. 
178. BW art. 7:907(4) (Neth.).  
179. See generally Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
180. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 25. 
181. Id. 
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Court of Appeal and deals with (to put it in briefly) corporate litigation.182 This 
fits well with mass damages claims related to financial products. The connection 
between the expertise of the Enterprise Division and mass damages might be less 
obvious when personal injury is involved, but the fact that it may be useful to 
have some experience in corporate litigation when handling WCAM cases, with 
their multitude of interested persons, cannot be excluded. Thus, concentrating 
WCAM cases in a single court is a positive step. Given that five of the six 
WCAM cases so far have concerned the field of finance, the rationale for the 
choice of the Amsterdam court seems better founded that might have been 
expected at the time the WCAM was designed. Although the Legislature’s 
motivation for this one court does not explicitly refer to WCAM cases on 
financial products and the usefulness of the experience of the Enterprise 
Division, choosing this court seems appropriate. 
Of course, the application for collective binding effect has to meet several 
requirements.183 For example, until July 2013 it was formally required that the 
names and addresses of all the victims known to the contracting parties had to be 
listed on the face of the application.184 However, the Amsterdam court has 
allowed names and addresses to be listed in an appendix. In the Vie d’Or case, a 
CD-ROM with these facts was allowed.185 It is now no longer required for the 
names of the victims known to the parties to be listed on the face of the 
application, but the court can order, on request or ex officio, that the names and 
addresses of the victims known to the contracting parties be supplied to the 
court.186 
All injured persons referred to in the settlement contract should have the 
opportunity to be heard on request and must be notified.187 This notification can 
be by normal post, unless the court decides otherwise.188 In the Shell case, the 
court allowed that potentially interested persons in the Netherlands, on whose 
behalf the agreement was concluded—as far as they were known to the 
claimants—be notified by normal post.189 In the Vie d’Or case, the court allowed 
that the persons on whose behalf the agreement was concluded and who resided 
in the Netherlands were notified by email.190 The recent amendment to the 
 
182. See generally ONDERNEMINGSKAMER, available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/organisatie/ 
gerechtshoven/amsterdam/overhetgerechtshof/organisatie/ondernemingskamer/pages/default.aspx#TOCHeadin
gRichHtmlFIeld17. 
183. See generally RV art. 1013(1) (Neth.). 
184. See generally id. 
185. Vie D’Or, supra note 12. 
186. See RV art. 1013(6) (Neth.) (stating that it is sufficient to note the last addresses of the victims 
known to the contracting parties).  
187. See id. at art. 1013(5). 
188. Id. 
189. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. 
190. If the requesting parties did not have the email addresses, notification by regular letter was 
permitted. Vie D’Or, supra note 12. 
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WCAM follows this practice: the court may order the requesting parties to supply 
names and addresses of known victims, in a manner determined by the court.191 
Practice has demonstrated that websites can play a role regarding notification.192 
In addition to the calling of the persons known to the contracting parties, 
notification must be made in one or more newspapers (appointed by the court).193 
As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the WCAM, publication is 
essential because the identity of many interested persons can be unknown.194 The 
court can even decide that notification by regular letter is too great a burden, (if 
the number of interested persons involved is high) and order that notification in 
the press will suffice.195 
It is quite possible that at the time of the application—thus after agreement 
has been reached—several cases on the matter of the settlement agreement will 
have already been brought to court on an individual basis. These proceedings 
could have been initiated before the negotiations on the matter in question 
started.196 Proceedings concerning disputes that the settlement agreement aims to 
bring to an end will be suspended once a WCAM application for collective binding 
effect is filed.197 Before July 2013, individual proceedings were only suspended on 
request, but the recent amendment provided that a procedural action for suspension 
is unnecessary and a burden for many injured persons.198 However, if for some 
reason the parties would prefer to continue the individual proceedings, that is, of 
course, a valid ground for resumption.199 
As stated in Part IV, according to the Explanatory Memorandum to the recent 
amendments to the WCAM, the Dexia case has demonstrated that proceedings that 
were resumed during the opt-out term have led to case law that could influence 
other people’s decisions on whether to opt-out.200 Therefore, since July 2013, 
individual proceedings cannot be resumed until the opt-out term has elapsed.201 The 
WCAM formulates several grounds for resumption of these individual 
 
191. RV art. 1013(6) (Neth.). 
192. See Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12; see Vie D’Or, 
supra note 12; see Randstad Holding, supra note 12; see 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong (Applicants/ Converium), supra 
note 12; see Dexia Bank, supra note 12. 
193. RV art. 1017(3) (Neth.). 
194. MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 43. 
195. Id. The Shell case has demonstrated that calling in international cases can require extra attention, but 
that topic does not fall within the scope of this contribution. See H.B. Krans, The Dutch Class Action (Financial 
Settlement) Act in an International Context: The Shell Case and the Converium Case, 31 C.J.Q. 141, 147-48 
(2012) (on international notification in the Shell case and the Converium case). 
196. See Rv art. 1015(1) (Neth.). 
197. Id. 
198. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, pp. 21-22. 
199. RV art. 1015(2)(f) (Neth.). 
200. MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, pp. 21-22. 
201. Rv art. 1015(2)(b) (Neth.). 
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proceedings.202 One such ground is that it irrevocably establishes that the application 
for collective binding is not allowed.203 
VIII. OPTION TO OPT OUT 
If the agreement is declared generally binding and that decision has become 
final, all injured persons referred to in the contract are entitled to compensation 
according to the contract.204 From that moment on, injured persons referred to in 
the contract, who are entitled to compensation, can be considered as parties to the 
settlement agreement.205 This means that the victims from that point on—
technically parties to the contract—can claim performance of the agreement.206 
However, they lose their right to instigate actions themselves against the parties 
who committed themselves to pay compensation.207 To maintain the option to 
lodge an individual claim, they must opt-out.208 
The option to opt-out is an essential element in the WCAM system.209 Once 
the settlement agreement becomes binding on the victims referred to in the 
contract, and these victims lose their right to start individual proceedings, it is 
obvious that several important legal principles can be at issue, such as access to 
court and the right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial and independent 
judge.210 These issues were also recognized when designing the law.211 It was 
considered crucial that there should be an option for victims to step out of the 
contract and to maintain their freedom to initiate individual proceedings.212 
Therefore, the declaration has no effect upon a person entitled to compensation, 
who has notified by written communication that he does not want to be bound by 
the contract.213 
As a result, once the court has granted the application, injured persons 
entitled to compensation under the contract have to make up their minds: to opt-
out and maintain the option to instigate individual proceedings or take the 
compensation under the contract. Victims aiming for “the jackpot” will probably 
opt-out. However, if they initiate individual proceedings, the outcome is 
uncertain. They run the risk of ending up empty-handed. It seems logical to 
 
202. See BW arts. 7:907(1), 7:908(2) (Neth.). 
203. RV art. 1015(2)(c) (Neth.). 
204. BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.). 
205. Id. at art. 7:908(1). 
206. See id. 
207. See id. 
208. Id. at art. 7:908(2). 
209. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, pp. 30. 
210. Id.  
211. See id. 
212. Id. at 3.   
213. BW art. 7:908(2) (Neth.). 
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suppose that parties who committed themselves to provide compensation under 
the contract will not easily surrender in individual proceedings after an opt-out 
procedure. Injured parties who do not wish to handle their own cases will 
probably prefer “to stay in the contract” and maintain their right to their 
contractual claims. Compared to initiating individual proceedings, the contractual 
claim requires less effort and is a relatively easy road for individual victims to 
follow. On the other hand, the contractual compensation will probably not be full 
compensation, as it is the outcome of negotiations.214 In the Dexia case, the court 
established that the settlement agreement was the outcome of negotiations in a 
situation of uncertainty, and that on both sides concessions were made and 
chances were estimated.215 The mere fact that the agreement does not provide full 
compensation does not justify the conclusion that the contractual compensation is 
not fair, so ruled the court.216 And in the Shell case, the court took the uncertainty 
of the outcome of individual proceedings against Shell into account in its 
decision on the fairness of the agreed amounts.217 
The period for opt-out notification must be set by the court, but cannot be 
less than three months.218 In several cases so far, the court has set this term at 
three months, either ex officio219 or on request.220 In the Dexia case, the court set 
this term at six months.221 In the Shell case, the court underlined that the 
requirement of a written notification to opt-out is “light” and that this opt-out 
notification also can be done by email.222 In the Vedior case, the court ruled that a 
simple written notification from the person entitled to compensation under the 
contract that he does not want to be bound to the contract suffices.223 Van Mierlo 
has suggested that the individual proceedings brought by victims who have used 
the option to opt-out should be concentrated in a single court: the district court in 
Amsterdam. If appeals were lodged for such cases, they would therefore be 
brought before the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam.224 This suggestion did not 
make it into the WCAM.225 
 
214. Dexia Bank, supra note 12; see Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
215. Dexia Bank, supra note 12. 
216. Id. 
217. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. In the DES case, the court ruled that the settlement agreement 
was the result of negotiations. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12. 
218. BW art. 7:908(2) (Neth.). 
219. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; Vie D’Or, supra note 12. 
220. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. 
221. Dexia Bank, supra note 12. 
222. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. 
223. Vie D’Or, supra note 12. 
224. A.I.M. van Mierlo et al., Enkele Procesrechtelijke Kanttekeningen bij Wetsvoorstel 29 414 (Wet 
Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade), in HET WETSVOORSTEL COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING MASSASCHADE 11, 
23, (Nederlandse Vereniging Voor Procesrecht 2005). 
225. See generally Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act [WCAM 2005] (Neth.). 
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IX. RECENT EU RECOMMENDATION AND COMMUNICATION 
In June 2013, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation “on 
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress 
mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law.”226 The Commission also published a Communication “Towards a 
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress.”227 These were not the 
first steps at European level on the path to collective redress.228 For example, in 
2005 the Commission adopted a White Paper on antitrust damages actions,229 and 
in 2008, it adopted a Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress.230 In 
February 2012, the European Parliament adopted a resolution titled “Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress.”231 A more extensive 
description of European attention to the topic (including a public consultation 
and its outcomes) can be found in both the Recommendation and the 
Communication of June 2013.232 
The purpose of the Recommendation of June 2013 is to “facilitate access to 
justice, stop illegal practices[,] and enable injured parties to obtain compensation 
in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted under Union law, 
while ensuring appropriate procedural safeguards to avoid abusive litigation.”233 
This Recommendation sets out a set of basic principles.234 The Recommendation 
instructs, “[a]ll Member States should have collective redress mechanisms at 
national level for both injunctive and compensatory relief.”235 And these 
mechanisms should respect the basic principles of the Recommendation.236 The 
Recommendation formulates several “Principles Common To Injunctive And 
Compensatory Collective Redress,” such as standing to bring a collective action, 
 
226. Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on Common Principles for Injunctive and 
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted 
Under Union Law (2013/396/EU), 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60. 
227. EUR. PARL. DOC. 2011/2089(INI) (2012); Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
“Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress,” COM, 401 (June 11, 2013). 
228. See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules, COM, 165 (Apr. 2, 2008); see Commission of the European Communities, Towards a 
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, supra note 227, at 794. 
229. Commission of the European Communities, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for 
Collective Redress, supra note 227, at 794; Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on 
Damages for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, supra note 228, 165.  
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admissibility, information on a collective redress action and funding.237 It also 
contains “Specific Principles Relating To Injunctive Collective Redress,” on 
expedient procedures and efficient enforcement238 and “Specific Principles 
Relating To Compensatory Collective Redress,” on opting in, collective 
alternative dispute resolution and settlements, and the prohibition of punitive 
damages.239 
In a first reaction, the Dutch Minister stated (among other things) that E.U. 
involvement on the field of collective redress can have added value, as far as this 
involvement concerns trans-boundary cases.240 He also stated that the Netherlands 
wants to know if the principles formulated in the Recommendation and the 
Communication are also intended for cases without transboundary elements.241 
Lastly, the Minister stated that in the Netherlands the WCAM is based on an opt-
out mechanism to the satisfaction of all settling parties.242 
X. CONCLUSION 
The WCAM was innovative for Dutch law at the time of its introduction.243 
Although the Act seems to have been developed with a focus on personal injury 
cases, it has also proved effective for purely financial cases.244 The WCAM is not 
based on legal approaches to enforcing the need to reach a settlement,245 but 
practice has shown that the WCAM works.246 The first cases and WCAM’s 
evaluation in 2008 clarified that the WCAM provides Dutch law with a method 
for settling mass damages collectively.247 The recent introduction of the option for 
a pretrial hearing may turn out to be a useful instrument that could contribute to 
out-of-court settlement.248 The same can be said of the new opportunity to ask 
pre-judicial questions of the Supreme Court.249 
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